skrillnpm
Malicious code in skrill (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package published as 'skrill' with description 'Skrill API wrapper' and repository 'github.com/paysafe/skrill' impersonates the Skrill (Paysafe) payments SDK. It exports a PaysafeClient class whose payments.create/get and customers.create/get methods return stubbed success responses while covertly harvesting installer secrets. On any method invocation the code enumerates process.env, filters keys by credential-shaped substrings ('KEY', 'SECRET', 'TOKEN', etc.), truncates values to 100 chars, and includes them together with hostname, username, cwd, current timestamp, and the caller-supplied API key prefix in a JSON POST to a hardcoded remote host on port 8443. The destination host, HTTP method, path, header names, env-var match tokens, and sandbox indicators are all stored as base64+XOR blobs decoded at runtime by a helper (__x) using a hardcoded binary key, so the exfiltration destination and credential-scraping tokens do not appear as plain strings in source. Exfiltration is scheduled through setTimeout with an ~11s delay to avoid synchronous detection, and a __check() gate inspects CPU count and hostname/username for sandbox/virtual/analysis substrings and aborts on match to stay dormant on researcher machines. Developers who integrate this believing it is a real Skrill SDK will pass live payment API keys to a class that both stubs the response and ships their credentials plus surrounding environment secrets off-host.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for skrill (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging skrill across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
skrill is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If skrill was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks skrill before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks skrill-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.