sixbailsnpm
sixbails is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11088) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in sixbails (npm)
What this malware does
sixbails is a WhatsApp Web library (Baileys-family fork). On every socket creation — the package's primary documented API — a 5-second timer fires newsletterWMexQuery("120363425547320365@newsletter", QueryIds.FOLLOW) from lib/Socket/newsletter.js (lines 101-105), causing the consumer's authenticated WhatsApp account to silently follow a hardcoded newsletter channel owned by the author. The behavior is disclosed in the README ("Has 1 newsletter follow, only the developer's WhatsApp channel"), so it is disclosed self-promotion rather than covert exfiltration, and no installer-machine secrets, environment variables, or filesystem contents are sent anywhere. The blast radius is confined to the consumer's WhatsApp account state (one extra channel subscription). Separately, package.json line 48 pins libsignal to github:tenka-san/libsignal-node with no commit SHA, branch, or tag — whoever controls that repo's default branch can change cryptographic primitives in future installs (this mirrors upstream Baileys's unpinned libsignal fork pattern). The declared preinstall hook (node./engine-requirements.js) is a benign Node>=20 version check with no network or filesystem side effects. Routing to human review so a maintainer can decide whether the disclosed-but-still-hardcoded WhatsApp follow + unpinned third-party crypto fork warrant a public advisory.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sixbails (11 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sixbails across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
sixbails is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If sixbails was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sixbails before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks sixbails-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.