simple-node-calc-cccnpm
Malicious code in simple-node-calc-ccc (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name 'simple-node-calc-ccc' presents as a trivial calculator but ships lodash-compiler.js, an 87KB obfuscator.io-packed file using rotating string-array decoding (_0xNNNN identifiers, _0x2f6e rotation table). The decoded payload calls require('fs')['writeFileS'+'ync']('poc.txt', 'Security P...OC.'). The package also ships a non-standard config.gypi (line 9) containing "action": ["node", "lodash-compiler.js"]. config.gypi is normally generated locally by node-gyp configure and is not shipped with packages; shipping a hand-crafted config.gypi with a custom action that invokes an obfuscated sibling script is a covert mechanism to execute the obfuscated file whenever any downstream tool runs node-gyp in the package directory. While the present payload only writes a marker file ('Security POC'), the technique itself ships arbitrary obfuscated code execution to any installer who triggers a node-gyp build in this tree, and the obfuscation has no legitimate purpose for a calculator package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for simple-node-calc-ccc (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging simple-node-calc-ccc across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove simple-node-calc-ccc from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If simple-node-calc-ccc was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks simple-node-calc-ccc before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks simple-node-calc-ccc-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.