simple-node-calc-cnpm
Malicious code in simple-node-calc-c (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package advertises itself as a 7-function calculator but ships an undeclared 87KB heavily obfuscated file lodash-compiler.js (obfuscator.io string-array packing with rotation and control-flow flattening) that is not referenced from index.js or package.json. The published binding.gyp declares only a benign noop target, but the tarball also ships a pre-generated build/ directory whose top-level Makefile includes lodash_action.target.mk, whose all target runs node lodash-compiler.js. When deobfuscated, the file performs a top-level require('fs').writeFileSync('poc.txt','Security POC.') — confirming arbitrary code execution via the build pipeline. The mismatch between the sanitized binding.gyp and the shipped Makefile is consistent with build-cache smuggling: a default npm install regenerates Makefiles from binding.gyp and neutralizes the payload, but npm rebuild, make invoked directly, or any node-gyp path that reuses cached build output will execute the obfuscated file. The filename impersonates lodash to evade casual review. The current payload writes a marker file, but the delivery mechanism (obfuscated, undeclared, hidden behind a sanitized gyp facade) provides the author with arbitrary code execution on rebuild paths.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for simple-node-calc-c (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging simple-node-calc-c across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
simple-node-calc-c is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove simple-node-calc-c, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If simple-node-calc-c was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks simple-node-calc-c before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks simple-node-calc-c-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.