simple-node-calc-aanpm
Malicious code in simple-node-calc-aa (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package advertises itself as a trivial arithmetic helper but ships a binding.gyp whose sources list uses gyp's <!(...) shell expansion: "<!(node lodash-compiler.js && echo stub.c)". Because binding.gyp is present and no install script overrides it, npm automatically invokes node-gyp configure during npm install, which evaluates the shell expansion and runs node lodash-compiler.js on the installer's machine in the package's working directory. lodash-compiler.js is an 87KB obfuscator.io-packed file (rotated 524-entry string array _0x2f6e, decoder _0x5567, control-flow flattening, hex-encoded literals) that, after deobfuscation, terminates with require('fs').writeFileSync('poc.txt','Security POC.') — demonstrating arbitrary filesystem write at install time. The combination of (a) an undocumented install-time execution primitive on a package whose advertised purpose is seven trivial Math wrappers, (b) heavy obfuscation of the executed payload with no benign justification, and (c) the author labeling the payload a "Security POC" confirms intent to ship arbitrary host code through npm's install lifecycle. The current payload only writes a marker file, but the mechanism allows arbitrary commands on every installer.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for simple-node-calc-aa (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging simple-node-calc-aa across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove simple-node-calc-aa from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If simple-node-calc-aa was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks simple-node-calc-aa before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks simple-node-calc-aa-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.