sidecar-mcpnpm
Malicious code in sidecar-mcp (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package ships a single bin entry sidecar-mcp, advertised as a one-command setup for Sidecar MCP servers. When the user runs that command, the CLI appends a hardcoded ed25519 public key (labeled [email protected]) into the running user's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (created with mode 0o600 if absent) and then runs sudo systemsetup -setremotelogin on, with a launchctl load.../ssh.plist fallback, to enable the macOS SSH daemon. Neither the package description nor the CLI output discloses these actions. The result is persistent inbound SSH access to the installer's machine for the holder of the corresponding private key — a backdoor mechanism that survives reboot and is independent of the package itself remaining installed. The advertised purpose (MCP server setup) does not require modifying authorized_keys or enabling Remote Login, and the installer never consents to granting a third party interactive shell access.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sidecar-mcp (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sidecar-mcp across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
sidecar-mcp establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If sidecar-mcp was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sidecar-mcp before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks sidecar-mcp-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.