sendgrid-sdknpm
sendgrid-sdk is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5572) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1, 0.1.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in sendgrid-sdk (npm)
What this malware does
Package impersonates the official SendGrid npm packages (@sendgrid/*) but ships no SDK functionality — index.js exports an empty object. Its sole purpose is a postinstall recon beacon. On npm install, postinstall.js collects extensive installer-side identifiers — hostname, reverse-DNS FQDN, OS user, USERPROFILE, Active Directory domain (USERDNSDOMAIN, USERDOMAIN, LOGONSERVER), proxy/VPN/ZScaler environment signals, OneDrive corporate flag, install working directory, and CI repository identifiers (GitHub/GitLab/CircleCI/Travis/Bitbucket/Azure/Jenkins URLs and npm registry) — and transmits them via plain HTTP GET to http://46.224.67.169:3000/ping with each field as a query parameter (pkg, addomain, fullpath, etc.). The combination of name impersonation, empty SDK surface, and unsolicited fingerprinting of corporate AD/CI environments to a bare-IP HTTP endpoint is recon staging for follow-on supply-chain or phishing attacks. README framing this as a "honeypot" does not constitute installer consent — the package is published to the public npm registry where any developer mistyping the SendGrid name will trigger the beacon.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sendgrid-sdk (9 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sendgrid-sdk across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
sendgrid-sdk establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If sendgrid-sdk was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sendgrid-sdk before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks sendgrid-sdk-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.