secdrivennpm
Malicious code in secdriven (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, postinstall.js executes whoami via child_process and reads os.hostname(), os.platform(), the working directory, and CI / GITHUB_REPOSITORY environment variables, then transmits them as query-string parameters in an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded interactsh subdomain (lg5ys3jebfzwk366pilidbmah1nsbszh.oastify.com) under the path /google/secdriven/. A DNS lookup using whoami output as a subdomain provides a fallback exfiltration channel. The package description ("Security research canary — Google") and README pointing at a Google CTF internal package.json indicate this is a dependency-confusion payload targeting Google's internal namespace; any installer whose resolver picks up this public name leaks host identity, username, working directory, and CI repository path to the third-party OOB-detection endpoint without consent. Whether published as research or attack, the installer-side effect is the same: unconsented identity-and-environment beacon at install time.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'secdriven' @ 1.0.8 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for secdriven (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging secdriven across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
secdriven is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If secdriven was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks secdriven before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks secdriven-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.