search-from-feednpm
Malicious code in search-from-feed (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is a dependency-confusion attack package. package.json declares both preinstall and postinstall as node callback.js, so the payload fires automatically on every npm install. callback.js (lines 12-15 require https/http/os/child_process) collects the installer's username, uid/gid, homedir, hostname, cwd, local IP and external IP (queried from https://api.ipify.org), along with CI environment variables (GITHUB_TOKEN/GITHUB_REPOSITORY/GITHUB_ACTOR, GITLAB_*, JENKINS, BUILD_NUMBER, etc.), and POSTs the collected data to a hardcoded Discord webhook (https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1516163806559076442/...). It additionally probes for AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN and DOCKER_PASSWORD and reports the presence of these secrets to the same webhook, flagging which CI runners are worth pivoting into. The 999.0.0 version is the canonical dependency-confusion shape, designed to outrank an organization's internal package of the same name during public-registry resolution. The package's own source comments self-describe it as a 'Dependency Confusion PoC,' but the install-time beacon to an attacker-controlled webhook with CI-secret enumeration is an active supply-chain attack regardless of framing.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for search-from-feed (version 999.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging search-from-feed across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
search-from-feed is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If search-from-feed was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks search-from-feed before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks search-from-feed-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.