screenpipe-mcp-httpnpm
Malicious code in screenpipe-mcp-http (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is a dependency-confusion lure that beacons installer-identifying data to an attacker-controlled domain on npm install. The package.json declares an absurdly high version (9999.99.99) with description 'npm 404 error referenced in screenpipe/screenpipe', the canonical shape of a dependency-confusion claim against an unregistered name referenced by an upstream project. A postinstall hook (postinstall.js) POSTs a JSON body to https://ddactic-lab.online/sc/beacon containing the npm package name/version, Node version, OS, CI detection flag, and GitHub Actions metadata (GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER, GITHUB_WORKFLOW). To bypass corporate HTTP egress filters, the same data is also encoded into a subdomain of b.ddactic-lab.online and exfiltrated via DNS lookup. index.js further recursively requires its own name (module.exports = require('screenpipe-mcp-http')), so any internal upstream reference that resolves through npm pulls this attacker-controlled package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for screenpipe-mcp-http (version 9999.99.99). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging screenpipe-mcp-http across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
screenpipe-mcp-http is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If screenpipe-mcp-http was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks screenpipe-mcp-http before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks screenpipe-mcp-http-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.