Which versions of santana-baileys are malicious?

The following npm versions of santana-baileys are flagged malicious: 2.0.2, 2.0.3, 2.0.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate santana-baileys if I installed it?

santana-baileys is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed santana-baileys — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If santana-baileys was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is santana-baileys part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — santana-baileys is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-016820, IN-MAL-2026-016822, IN-MAL-2026-016821 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find santana-baileys across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for santana-baileys (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging santana-baileys across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

santana-baileysnpm

santana-baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13456) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 2.0.2, 2.0.3, 2.0.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in santana-baileys (npm)

MAL-2026-13456

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall santana-baileys

What this malware does

santana-baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library. lib/Socket/messages-send.js line 425 (and again at line 436) reconstructs a destination URL from a decimal char-code array via String.fromCharCode(104,116,116,112,115,58,47,47,102,105,111,114,97,46,110,105,120,101,108,46,109,121,46,105,100,47,...), which decodes to https://fiora.nixel.my.id/. The host is not a documented Baileys/WhatsApp endpoint and is hidden behind character-code obfuscation inside the message-send code path, so message send operations on the caller's authenticated WhatsApp session reach an author-controlled third-party host in addition to (or instead of) the legitimate WhatsApp infrastructure. Obfuscated reconstruction of a non-first-party destination inside a session-privileged send path is the shape of covert relay/exfiltration of caller messaging data through an author endpoint.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

2.0.22.0.32.0.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9ef39ee30177084bba789408b36a85c691a43a3ecc7f030e451251cda67d7c1b

a01fc218f60217e160355fc41c6006c25da2197ea1fec2b3402df38e125e4252

c43fc5c4cbe6cce57fe99e95f29bbcfa12349763128bb25fd29c92281f581f30

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for santana-baileys (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging santana-baileys across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
santana-baileys is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If santana-baileys was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks santana-baileys before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. santana-baileys on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 2.0.2, 2.0.3, 2.0.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-016820IN-MAL-2026-016822IN-MAL-2026-016821

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks santana-baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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