Which versions of sakuraai are malicious?

The following npm versions of sakuraai are flagged malicious: 0.0.11. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate sakuraai if I installed it?

sakuraai is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed sakuraai — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If sakuraai was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is sakuraai part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — sakuraai is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010764 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find sakuraai across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sakuraai (version 0.0.11). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sakuraai across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

sakuraainpm

Malicious code in sakuraai (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10746

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall sakuraai

What this malware does

When the daemon is started (e.g. via sakura daemon start), the package binds an HTTP+WebSocket server on 0.0.0.0 and additionally exposes it via a Tailscale sidecar. The WebSocket handler spawns an interactive OS shell (process.env.SHELL || /bin/zsh on Unix, cmd.exe on Windows) with the -i flag and pipes incoming WebSocket {type:'input', data:...} frames directly into the shell's stdin, streaming stdout/stderr back over the same socket (dist/index.js: spawn(shell, ["-i"],...), writeTerminal(ws, msg.data), server.listen(port, host === "127.0.0.1"? "0.0.0.0": host,...)). Any party with network reachability to the daemon — anyone on the LAN, or anyone with a valid bearer token over the Tailscale tailnet — obtains full-host command execution as the user running the daemon. A separate postinstall script (scripts/download-tsnet.js, scripts/download-onboard.js) fetches sakura-tsnet / sakura-onboard binaries from https://github.com/Nishu0/sakura-tsnet/releases/download/v<version>/... over HTTPS, pinned to the package version but without hash/signature verification; the publishing GitHub account (Nishu0) is a personal account rather than an organization matching the advertised Sakura / sakura.mom publisher identity.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.0.11

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d0910c3572d73bd98775851cb79032ba00dbceda2de969b25f04a7a7d1ddfe4e

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for sakuraai (version 0.0.11). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging sakuraai across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
sakuraai is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If sakuraai was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks sakuraai before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. sakuraai on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.0.11 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010764

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks sakuraai-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring