runhelpernpm
runhelper is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17332) that runs destructive / sabotage code (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in runhelper (npm)
What this malware does
On require('runhelper'), index.js unconditionally loads a payload file staged by its dependency imgbundle at cdn-img-fetch/.runtime/rt.jpg, allocates executable memory via kernel32 VirtualAlloc with PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE (0x40) and MEM_COMMIT|MEM_RESERVE (0x3000) through the koffi FFI, copies the file bytes with RtlMoveMemory, and executes them with CreateThread. The payload file is deleted after launch, and an fs.watch waits for it if not yet present. The .jpg extension in a hidden .runtime directory disguises an executable payload, and all errors are swallowed with empty catch (_) {} blocks. The advertised exec() spawn wrapper described in the README is a cover story: the module's top-level behavior on load is native shellcode execution. The manifest pins imgbundle@^1.0.0 (payload source) and koffi@^2.8.0 (FFI used to run it); the loader/payload split means anything that transitively requires runhelper on Windows fetches and executes attacker-supplied native code in-process.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Destructive / sabotageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for runhelper (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging runhelper across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
runhelper carries a destructive/sabotage payload. Remove it immediately, restore any affected data from clean backups, and verify integrity of build outputs that may have been tampered with.
Did it already run?
If runhelper was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks runhelper before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks runhelper-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.