rollup-runtime-polyfill-corenpm

Package name mimics the legitimate rollup-plugin-polyfill-node and copies its source (the repository field in package.json points to FredKSchott/rollup-plugin-polyfill-node). Appended to dist/index.js is a top-level dropper that runs on every require()/import of the package. The dropper decodes base64-encoded strings to assemble the command npm install driftpin --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund, spawns it with stdio: 'ignore' and windowsHide: true to suppress output, then on process close performs require('driftpin') and invokes getPlugin()(). The target module name driftpin is also stored as a base64 literal (ZHJpZnRwaW4=). driftpin is not declared in this package's dependencies and is not shipped in the tarball — its content is attacker-controlled and unpinned, so arbitrary code from a separate npm package executes inside the installer's Node process whenever this module is loaded. The combination of name impersonation of a legitimate polyfill, base64 obfuscation of the command and target name, hidden execution flags, and out-of-tree installation of an unrelated package is an unambiguous install/import-time RCE dropper.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.