Which versions of roidjs are malicious?

The following npm versions of roidjs are flagged malicious: 0.1.7. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate roidjs if I installed it?

roidjs is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed roidjs — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If roidjs was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is roidjs part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — roidjs is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004830 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find roidjs across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for roidjs (version 0.1.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging roidjs across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

roidjsnpm

Malicious code in roidjs (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4663

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall roidjs

What this malware does

package.json declares "preinstall": "./bin/install-deps", which causes npm install roidjs to auto-execute bin/install-deps — a 976,568-byte Linux x86_64 ELF whose embedded strings include LIBBPF_0.0, PTRACE, NETLINK, RSA_PKCS1_, Ed25519, https://, HTTP/1.1, POST, and USERPROFILE. The package advertises itself as a tiny React+Recoil state helper (the actual JS in dist/cjs/index.js is ~1.7 KB of pure JavaScript) and has no documented native dependency that would justify shipping or running such a binary. The capabilities suggested by the binary's strings (eBPF, ptrace, NETLINK, outbound HTTPS POST, cross-platform user-profile path handling, asymmetric crypto) are inconsistent with a state-management library. The publisher provides no source for the binary, no build manifest, no checksum, and no integrity verification — the installer has no way to know what runs as their user when the lifecycle hook fires. The shape (opaque native dropper invoked from preinstall, purpose mismatch with package description, no provenance) matches the generic-binary-runner-dropper pattern.

This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.7

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

46b2c3afc1b9dd20ecad5f3b47c333e8324500e3d0102df362aa7c11a60469a0

146faaf0d97c6a533a969bc3f3f117811f9317dc865ed4ab37f1679842ddeaae

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for roidjs (version 0.1.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging roidjs across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
roidjs is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If roidjs was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks roidjs before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. roidjs on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.7 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004830

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks roidjs-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring