react-wp-viewernpm
Malicious code in react-wp-viewer (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
react-wp-viewer 0.2.4 is a dependency-confusion package. Its postinstall hook performs an HTTP GET to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://130.49.177.51:18080/p/dc-20260627-yandex-geobase carrying the package name, version, and a fixed nonce. The package self-identifies as a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept (__dependency_confusion_poc__: true) and the URL path encodes a campaign identifier referencing an internal package namespace, indicating the public name is being squatted to win resolution against an identically-named private/internal package. Any build that resolves react-wp-viewer from the public registry will silently execute the postinstall beacon, disclosing the installer's source IP, hostname-derived network position, and the fact that this internal name resolves within their environment, to an attacker-controlled host over plain HTTP. No installer credentials are read in the traced code, but the install-time callout to an attacker-controlled IP is the dependency-confusion attack pattern and provides material reconnaissance value to the operator.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for react-wp-viewer (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging react-wp-viewer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
react-wp-viewer is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If react-wp-viewer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks react-wp-viewer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks react-wp-viewer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.