react-tabulix-querynpm
react-tabulix-query is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11015) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 0.1.0, 0.1.2, 0.1.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in react-tabulix-query (npm)
What this malware does
The package's package.json preinstall script runs dist/index.d.js, which base64-decodes an embedded payload and executes it. The decoded payload uses fetch() to retrieve code from https://everydaynodechecker-39143n.vercel.app/api/key?mem=root0 and passes the response body to eval, granting the remote endpoint arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine at npm install time. The eval identifier is reconstructed from a char-code array ([101,118,97,108]) and invoked via globalThistag to hide the sink from naive scanners. The filename index.d.js mimics a TypeScript declaration file to further disguise the dropper. There is no legitimate library functionality; the package's only observable behavior is the remote fetch-and-execute.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for react-tabulix-query (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging react-tabulix-query across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
react-tabulix-query is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove react-tabulix-query, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If react-tabulix-query was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks react-tabulix-query before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks react-tabulix-query-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.