react-next-vitenpm
Malicious code in react-next-vite (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package impersonates the pino logger (README/badges reference pino; module.exports.pino is the middleware) while its name is react-next-vite. When a consumer invokes the exported middleware factory in index.js, it spawns 'node lib/caller.js' as a detached child with stdio:'ignore' and calls child.unref(), hiding output from the parent process. lib/caller.js retrieves a JavaScript payload from a mutable IPFS gateway URL (bronze-improved-gibbon-411.mypinata.cloud/ipfs/bafkrei...) via axios.get and passes the response body to Function.constructor, invoking the resulting function with require in scope — giving the retrieved code full access to the host's Node runtime. Additional endpoints are hidden as base64-encoded strings in a fake process.env-shaped object in lib/caller.js and lib/const.js (e.g., DEV_API_KEY decodes to https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3), acting as a second-stage config channel. The combination of identity impersonation, stealth-spawned detached child, opaque remote-fetch-and-eval with require, and base64-hidden config URLs is a fully weaponized dropper that runs on any consumer that uses the module's default export.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for react-next-vite (version 1.2.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging react-next-vite across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
react-next-vite is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If react-next-vite was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks react-next-vite before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks react-next-vite-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.