react-context-form-tdsssnpm
Malicious code in react-context-form-tdsss (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is a dependency-confusion payload. package.json declares scripts.preinstall="node index.js", and index.js issues an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded interactsh/OAST subdomain (d8v0o1a9io6mjndcpbgghpfmkcgcm6dno.oast.online/npm-installed) on install. This beacon discloses the installer's public IP and confirms code execution on the installer's host to the operator of the OAST listener. The package.json description self-identifies as a dependency-confusion PoC and declares a self-dependency, the shape used to squat an internal/private package name on the public registry so that resolution in a victim environment pulls and executes this code. Installing this package causes outbound network beaconing on the installer's machine without consent.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'react-context-form-tdsss' @ 9.0.0 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for react-context-form-tdsss (version 9.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging react-context-form-tdsss across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
react-context-form-tdsss establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If react-context-form-tdsss was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks react-context-form-tdsss before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks react-context-form-tdsss-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.