Which versions of ratelimitsucks10 are malicious?

The following npm versions of ratelimitsucks10 are flagged malicious: 1.1.7, 1.7.7, 2.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate ratelimitsucks10 if I installed it?

ratelimitsucks10 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed ratelimitsucks10 — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If ratelimitsucks10 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is ratelimitsucks10 part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — ratelimitsucks10 is associated with the GHSA-7p55-rh6r-f7j9, IN-MAL-2026-010167, IN-MAL-2026-010163, IN-MAL-2026-010165 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find ratelimitsucks10 across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ratelimitsucks10 (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ratelimitsucks10 across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

ratelimitsucks10npm

Malicious code in ratelimitsucks10 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10366

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall ratelimitsucks10

What this malware does

The tarball ships auto-publish.sh, a script that republishes the same payload under ~100 distinct npm names (ishowfeet1-ishowfeet20, nottuff1-nottuff30, abuden*, imillegal*, ratelimitsucks*, etc/) by rewriting package.json.name and running npm publish --silent in a loop — namespace-spam infrastructure shipped inside the package itself. The package's declared main is sw.js, a browser Service Worker (importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js'), self.addEventListener('install'|'activate'|'fetch'|'message')) that throws immediately if loaded from Node. The shipped assets are a heavily obfuscated Ultraviolet/bare-mux web-proxy frontend with an index.html themed as "Riverbend Tutoring" that hides a popunder redirect to https://abdct.com/ on click/keydown/touchstart. package.json declares no preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare hooks, and require('ishowfeet9') from Node fails before any code runs, so a Node installer experiences no auto-execution. The harm is registry abuse (mass-publication of a misleading name family) and a browser-side proxy/popunder served to whoever later loads these static assets — not installer-side compromise. Routing to human review for namespace-abuse adjudication.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

1.1.71.7.72.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

4127202a948d45e019e064952ae565200ae19dad3fdf9d6086737e828413b37c

1ea43317a905d4e9b4a22dac3a0e325d92493557c5dc6b376f2e05d84d2fb29a

620e5d40dcff1d65e383250fca0bcead3c6de4222863c4db54d39548a8d0c048

bd44ada0299253a956662b8d3ac3ce03c6142bb56707a907deaff5aee5457674

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ratelimitsucks10 (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ratelimitsucks10 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ratelimitsucks10 establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If ratelimitsucks10 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ratelimitsucks10 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. ratelimitsucks10 on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.1.7, 1.7.7, 2.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-7p55-rh6r-f7j9IN-MAL-2026-010167IN-MAL-2026-010163IN-MAL-2026-010165

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks ratelimitsucks10-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring