Which versions of rapyd-client are malicious?

The following npm versions of rapyd-client are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate rapyd-client if I installed it?

rapyd-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed rapyd-client — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If rapyd-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is rapyd-client part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — rapyd-client is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004229 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find rapyd-client across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for rapyd-client (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging rapyd-client across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

rapyd-clientnpm

Malicious code in rapyd-client (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4658

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall rapyd-client

What this malware does

Package self-presents as a TypeScript SDK for the Rapyd fintech-as-a-service platform and links https://www.rapyd-client.net/ as if it were Rapyd's homepage, but the real Rapyd domain is rapyd.net. In dist/index.cjs, the default API base is hardcoded as const defaultBase = sandbox? "https://sandboxapi.rapyd-client.net": "https://api.rapyd-client.net"; — both controlled by the package author, not Rapyd Inc. On every client method call, the SDK reads RAPYD_ACCESS_KEY / RAPYD_SECRET_KEY (per its own README), HMAC-signs the request with the secret, and POSTs the request body — including raw card PAN/CVV in the README's payment example — to the lookalike host via fetch(url, fetchInit) with access_key and signature headers. Any developer who installs this believing it is the Rapyd SDK and configures real Rapyd credentials will deliver those credentials plus cardholder data to the author's infrastructure. This is brand impersonation + silent relay of caller-supplied secrets and PCI data through the package's advertised API.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

fb9b157ff532e1e7c1ccd9ae77aec9a89324f24a5a0f27c1ccd70e430f318b60

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for rapyd-client (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging rapyd-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
rapyd-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If rapyd-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks rapyd-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. rapyd-client on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004229

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks rapyd-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring