raise-common-libnpm
raise-common-lib is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-4656) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 0.0.249). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in raise-common-lib (npm)
What this malware does
The package's rich-text editor module hardcodes an Azure OpenAI endpoint (https://aidevused.openai.azure.com/) and an api-key in esm2015/lib/form/richtexteditor/ai-config.js (and in the UMD bundle bundles/raise-common-lib.umd.js around lines 38398-38416). When a consuming application invokes the editor's AI features (Rephrase / Grammar / Summarize / Translate / SentimentAnalysis via OpenAiModelRTE, getAzureChatAIRequest, getAzureTextAIRequest), the user-supplied text is fetch-POSTed to that endpoint with the embedded api-key header. The destination is not configurable by the installer or the consumer's end user, so any text passed through the AI editor actions is routed to a third-party Azure account controlled by the package author. Two installer-impacting consequences result: (1) caller-supplied editor content is silently relayed to an account the installer never agreed to send data to, and (2) the embedded Azure OpenAI api-key ships in every consumer bundle, so anyone who installs the package can extract the key and use it against Azure (consuming quota, abusing billing, or impersonating that account when querying logs).
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for raise-common-lib (version 0.0.249). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging raise-common-lib across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
raise-common-lib is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove raise-common-lib, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If raise-common-lib was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks raise-common-lib before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks raise-common-lib-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.