qr-code-styling-tempnpm
Malicious code in qr-code-styling-temp (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's install lifecycle script (node index.js) and its main entry both load lib/core.js, which reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and the current working directory basename and encodes them into a subdomain of oob.sl4x0.xyz, then triggers a dns.resolve4 lookup of samsung.<user>.<host>.<cwd>.<ts>.oob.sl4x0.xyz. This is an out-of-band DNS exfiltration beacon that fires on every npm install and on every require() of the package, leaking installer identity to an attacker-controlled domain. Module names (os, dns, process, userInfo, hostname, resolve4) and the C2 domain are hidden as String.fromCharCode charcode arrays in lib/b02e30.js and lib/6ad264.js, with os and dns loaded via module.constructor._load(...) to evade static require scanners. The package name impersonates the popular qr-code-styling library but ships an unrelated API surface, and the author email [email protected] shares the same domain as the exfiltration host — confirming the typosquat lure and attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for qr-code-styling-temp (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging qr-code-styling-temp across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
qr-code-styling-temp is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If qr-code-styling-temp was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks qr-code-styling-temp before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks qr-code-styling-temp-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.