pvm-autodocnpm
pvm-autodoc is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12421) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 20.4.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in pvm-autodoc (npm)
What this malware does
On require('pvm-autodoc'), index.js loads bridge.js which downloads a platform-specific native binary from one of four hardcoded Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS TXT base64 chunked fallback under *.dl.well1.site. The destination hostnames are constructed by string-splitting and joining at runtime to evade static analysis. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache<hex> on POSIX or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows (a name mimicking a Microsoft diagnostic tool), chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start. Opt-out variables and file naming are framed as 'analytics'/'telemetry' while the actual behavior is fetch-and-execute of an unpinned, unverified opaque native binary. A second file, lib/telemetry.js, is shipped in the tarball with the same fetch-decode-chmod-spawn primitives using concatenated API names ('child_'+'process', 'chmod'+'Sync') as a companion payload.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pvm-autodoc (version 20.4.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pvm-autodoc across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pvm-autodoc is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove pvm-autodoc, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If pvm-autodoc was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pvm-autodoc before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks pvm-autodoc-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.