prjct-clinpm
Malicious code in prjct-cli (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, scripts/postinstall.js invokes scripts/ensure-bun.sh, which runs curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash with no version pin and no hash/signature verification. The bin shim (bin/prjct) subsequently prefers the freshly installed bun over node and uses it to execute the package's sibling dist/bin/prjct.mjs. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper shape: arbitrary bytes served by the upstream URL at install time become a runtime that then executes package code, bypassing Node-aware tooling and any pinned-version assumptions. Whatever bun.sh serves at the moment of install is granted execution on the installer's machine. Even though the destination is the genuine Bun publisher, the unpinned curl|bash pattern means the installer has no way to verify what bytes are executed; a future compromise of bun.sh, a TLS interception, or a mutable installer script change all silently ship arbitrary code into the install. The bin shim additionally mutates $HOME (writing into ~/.claude, ~/.codex, ~/.prjct-cli, creating symlinks in $HOME) on every invocation — content is package-owned and matches the advertised AI-agent integration purpose, but it is aggressive install practice worth flagging.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for prjct-cli (version 2.21.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging prjct-cli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove prjct-cli from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If prjct-cli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks prjct-cli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks prjct-cli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.