prisma-callbacknpm
prisma-callback is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-3770) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.3, 1.0.4…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in prisma-callback (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] is a name-confusion package against the genuine prisma ORM. Its package.json declares "preinstall": "node./scripts/only-allow-pnpm.js pnpm"; despite the misleading filename, that script dispatches on os.arch() and unconditionally executes one of two Go binaries shipped at the tarball root — prisma-amd64 (sha256 7255674131eee4a4b9adb12196a1b66e3faad9ee60740ab01b4d4e91bf8a30a8, 1,597,624 bytes) or prisma-arm64 (sha256 270769b70e1fe3718243e5f2f4655d9dd5d3b9f6e7217919d724859f7d6a66db, 2,162,872 bytes) — via child_process.execSync with inherited stdio, running under whatever privileges npm install holds. Neither binary exists in the genuine Prisma source tree; both are opaque compiled artifacts the installer cannot inspect or verify. To lower scrutiny, the tarball ships a verbatim copy of the real Prisma monorepo (README badges, issue templates, and every sub-package's package.json point at github.com/prisma/prisma), and the preinstall script carries a // This script is safe — it's only used for testing purposes. comment to discourage review. The structural signals — typosquat of a top-tier OSS package + undeclared opaque native binaries + preinstall-time execution without integrity verification + deliberate misdirection via filename, comment, and legitimate-looking cover source — are jointly unambiguous.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for prisma-callback (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging prisma-callback across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
prisma-callback is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove prisma-callback, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If prisma-callback was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks prisma-callback before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks prisma-callback-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.