prisma-callbacknpm
Malicious code in prisma-callback (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] is a name-confusion package against the genuine prisma ORM. Its package.json declares "preinstall": "node./scripts/only-allow-pnpm.js pnpm"; despite the misleading filename, that script dispatches on os.arch() and unconditionally executes one of two Go binaries shipped at the tarball root — prisma-amd64 (sha256 7255674131eee4a4b9adb12196a1b66e3faad9ee60740ab01b4d4e91bf8a30a8, 1,597,624 bytes) or prisma-arm64 (sha256 270769b70e1fe3718243e5f2f4655d9dd5d3b9f6e7217919d724859f7d6a66db, 2,162,872 bytes) — via child_process.execSync with inherited stdio, running under whatever privileges npm install holds. Neither binary exists in the genuine Prisma source tree; both are opaque compiled artifacts the installer cannot inspect or verify. To lower scrutiny, the tarball ships a verbatim copy of the real Prisma monorepo (README badges, issue templates, and every sub-package's package.json point at github.com/prisma/prisma), and the preinstall script carries a // This script is safe — it's only used for testing purposes. comment to discourage review. The structural signals — typosquat of a top-tier OSS package + undeclared opaque native binaries + preinstall-time execution without integrity verification + deliberate misdirection via filename, comment, and legitimate-looking cover source — are jointly unambiguous.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for prisma-callback (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging prisma-callback across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
prisma-callback is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove prisma-callback, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If prisma-callback was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks prisma-callback before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks prisma-callback-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.