power-platform-playwright-toolkitnpm
Malicious code in power-platform-playwright-toolkit (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall script (postinstall.js) collects host identifiers and CI context — whoami, os.hostname(), os.platform(), cwd, CI, GITHUB_REPOSITORY, NODE_ENV — and sends them off the installer's machine via two channels: an HTTPS GET to 6v2j7oyzq0ehzolr4303sw1vwm2gqje8.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator out-of-band callback host) at path /microsft?<querystring>, and a DNS lookup of <whoami>.6v2j7oyzq0ehzolr4303sw1vwm2gqje8.oastify.com to leak the username via DNS even when HTTPS egress is blocked. The package name impersonates Microsoft's Power Platform Playwright tooling namespace, and the exfil path token microsft (note the misspelling) serves as a campaign tag. The script self-describes as a 'security research canary' / 'Takeover By lobo', but installers have not consented to off-host data transmission and the captured data (GitHub repository identifier, CI flag, hostname, username) is direct reconnaissance value to whoever controls the OAST subdomain.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for power-platform-playwright-toolkit (version 1.0.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging power-platform-playwright-toolkit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
power-platform-playwright-toolkit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If power-platform-playwright-toolkit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks power-platform-playwright-toolkit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks power-platform-playwright-toolkit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.