power-appsnpm
Malicious code in power-apps (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, postinstall.js executes whoami, id, and reads os.hostname(), os.platform(), process.cwd(), and CI/GitHub environment variables, then sends the collected data as query-string parameters via HTTPS GET to br6o3tu4m5amvthw08w8o1x0srykmia7.oastify.com (a Burp Collaborator out-of-band callback domain). The script also performs a DNS lookup of <whoami>.<callback-host> as a secondary exfiltration channel. The package name impersonates Microsoft Power Apps and the request path includes /microsft (sic), indicating supply-chain reconnaissance against developers searching for Microsoft Power Apps tooling. Installing this package on a developer workstation or CI runner leaks host identity and pipeline environment metadata to an attacker-controlled collaborator endpoint.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'power-apps' @ 2.0.4 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
-
The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
-
The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for power-apps (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging power-apps across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
power-apps is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If power-apps was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks power-apps before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks power-apps-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.