post-css-transfernpm
post-css-transfer is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12417) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 0.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in post-css-transfer (npm)
What this malware does
post-css-transfer is a typosquat of postcss whose main entry lib/postcss.js has an obfuscated IIFE appended after the legitimate module code. On require/import, the appended block resolves a command-and-control IP by reading transactions of Ethereum address 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a via public Ethereum RPC endpoints and the eth.blockscout.com API, decodes two IPv4 addresses from the transaction recipient bytes, fetches an XOR-encrypted payload over HTTP from those hosts (delivered in an x-payload-b64 header), and executes the decrypted payload via eval() and a detached node -e child process. Network, execution, and identifier primitives (http, child_process, spawn, the Ethereum address, method and header names) are written as \uXXXX escapes and hidden behind ~1KB of whitespace padding after module.exports = postcss; to evade casual review.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for post-css-transfer (version 0.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging post-css-transfer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
post-css-transfer establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If post-css-transfer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks post-css-transfer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks post-css-transfer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.