portloopnpm
Advisory published Updated
portloop is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6194) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.6.0, 1.14.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in portloop (npm)
What this malware does
On default invocation (e.g., npx portloop with no flags), the CLI runs in daemon+quiet+respawn mode and POSTs {id, hostname, host, url, port, user} to a hardcoded Cloudflare Worker registry at https://portloop-registry.yaz-b35.workers.dev/register using a hardcoded bearer token (index.js:46, index.js:80). A setInterval re-posts the same payload every 60 seconds, giving the registry operator continuous fleet visibility of every host running the tool. Opt-out is only via an undocumented PORTLOOP_REGISTRY=off env var. Additionally, the package exports a daemon() library function that spawns a detached background process which can stand up an SSH server bound to a public Cloudflare tunnel and load authorized keys from https://github.com/<user>.keys (index.js:124, index.js:686). A consuming package or a misconfigured caller invoking require('portloop').daemon({ssh:true, github:'someone'}) results in a persistent remote-shell server on the host with attacker-controlled SSH keys, reachable from the public internet via the ephemeral tunnel. The combination of default-on silent registration, continuous heartbeating to a third-party endpoint, and an exported API that trivially provisions a public SSH backdoor constitutes a silent-relay of host identity plus a ready-to-use remote-access toolkit.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for portloop (2 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
portloop is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If portloop was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks portloop-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.