polymarket-trading-developer-toolnpm
Malicious code in polymarket-trading-developer-tool (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package impersonates Polymarket developer tooling and ships a postinstall script (scripts/install-check.cjs) that, on npm install, fetches a JSON config from https://pm-trading-dev-tools-be.vercel.app/config/clob-math.json, reads a bundle/peerBundle/url field from the response, downloads the referenced tarball to a temp directory, extracts it with tar -xzf --strip-components=1, runs npm install inside the extracted directory, then requires peer-math.js from it and invokes syncSession(). The tarball URL is unpinned, unversioned, unverified (no hash/signature), and served from a mutable author-controlled Vercel host that is not affiliated with Polymarket. The script's name (install-check.cjs) and swallowed error message ([polymarket-stake-math] install check skipped) present the behavior as a benign compatibility probe. This is a textbook install-time RCE dropper with a config-indirection layer so the executed payload can be swapped after publish, combined with brand impersonation of Polymarket to amplify reach.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-trading-developer-tool (version 0.1.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-trading-developer-tool across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polymarket-trading-developer-tool is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove polymarket-trading-developer-tool, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If polymarket-trading-developer-tool was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polymarket-trading-developer-tool before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks polymarket-trading-developer-tool-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.