polymarket-trader-apisnpm
Malicious code in polymarket-trader-apis (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] advertises itself as a Polymarket trading helper but its main entry is a remote code loader. The default-exported getPlugin fetches JSON from https://svganchordev.net/icons/108 and passes the response's credits field to new Function('require','module','exports',...,'Promise', data.credits), then invokes it with require, process, Buffer, and other Node globals in scope — granting the remote operator arbitrary code execution in the caller's Node process. The code is wrapped in cover-story framing (an IconProvider/font-awesome CDN map referencing cloudflare/fastly/akamai and a /ajax/libs/font-awesome/6.4.0/svgs/brands/ path) to make the loader appear to be an SVG icon fetcher, and the package keywords (react,helper,svg) contradict the stated Polymarket purpose. Declared dependencies (@primno/dpapi, node-machine-id, better-sqlite3, sqlite3) are consistent with second-stage credential/browser-database harvesting once the fetched payload executes. The remote endpoint is a non-first-party domain unrelated to Polymarket, the payload is opaque and author-mutable, and there is no integrity verification.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-trader-apis (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-trader-apis across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polymarket-trader-apis is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If polymarket-trader-apis was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polymarket-trader-apis before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks polymarket-trader-apis-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.