polymarket-toolkitnpm
Malicious code in polymarket-toolkit (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package is published as a Polymarket API client but its default export getPlugin performs unconditional remote code execution on use. On invocation it issues an HTTPS request to https://svganchordev.net/icons/109, takes the data.credits field from the JSON response, and passes it to new Function('require','module',...,'Promise', data.credits) with a context object exposing require, process, Buffer, and related Node primitives, then immediately invokes it. The fetched JavaScript runs with full Node privileges on the installer's machine. The surrounding code is dressed as an icon/CDN helper (variable names IconProvider, iconDomain, a map of cloudflare/fastly/akamai hosts, font-awesome path literals), but those strings are unused decoys; the live request path resolves to the hardcoded svganchordev.net host. Declared dependencies (@primno/dpapi for Windows DPAPI, better-sqlite3, node-machine-id) are consistent with browser-credential and machine-fingerprint extraction and are unrelated to a Polymarket API SDK. Package keywords (react, helper, svg) also do not match the advertised purpose. The shape is a brand-impersonating dropper targeting developers searching for a Polymarket toolkit.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-toolkit (version 1.4.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-toolkit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polymarket-toolkit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If polymarket-toolkit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polymarket-toolkit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks polymarket-toolkit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.