polymarket-stake-mathssnpm
polymarket-stake-mathss is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13707) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 3.5.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in polymarket-stake-mathss (npm)
What this malware does
Typosquat of polymarket-stake-math (double s). The postinstall script (install-check.cjs) resolves a bundle URL from the package.json homepage field (https://log-taker.store/config/stake-math-sync.json), downloads a tarball via fetchToFile, extracts it with tar -xzf, runs npm install inside the extracted directory, then require()s .peer/peer-math.js and invokes syncSession(). The fetch is unpinned, unsigned, and points at an author-controlled domain unrelated to any Polymarket infrastructure. The install-time code path is wrapped in benign-sounding identifiers (resolvePeerBundleUrl, runPeerSync, extractPeerBundle, PSM_INSTALL_FAST) that imitate a legitimate peer-dependency check. Installing the package causes arbitrary attacker-controlled code from log-taker.store to execute on the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-stake-mathss (version 3.5.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-stake-mathss across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polymarket-stake-mathss is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove polymarket-stake-mathss, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If polymarket-stake-mathss was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polymarket-stake-mathss before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks polymarket-stake-mathss-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.