polymarket-stake-mathnpm
Malicious code in polymarket-stake-math (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package ships a postinstall hook (scripts/sync-peer.cjs) that runs on every default npm install. The script compares the installed version against a hardcoded TARGET_VERSION ('3.4.0'); because the shipped version is 3.5.0, the mismatch branch always fires. It then invokes execSync('npm pack [email protected]'...), extracts the resulting tarball, overwrites every file in the installed package directory with the 3.4.0 contents via fs.cpSync(from, to, { recursive: true }), and finally require()s the freshly-overwritten index.js and calls from_str(). This is a stager pattern: the published 3.5.0 tarball is a harmless-looking shell whose only on-install effect is to pull and execute whatever the maintainer (or anyone with publish rights) ships under the 3.4.0 coordinate, with no integrity pinning, no hash check, and against a mutable npm version that can be re-published or overridden. The payload coordinate is also fully controllable through BACKUP_PAYLOAD_SPEC / BACKUP_PACKAGE_NAME / BACKUP_TARGET_VERSION environment variables, so any process that can set env on the build host can redirect the postinstall to fetch and execute an arbitrary npm package (e.g. [email protected]). The cover-story filename 'sync-peer.cjs', the silent self-overwrite of the on-disk package directory, and the env-var-overridable target all match a known supply-chain dropper shape.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-stake-math (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-stake-math across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polymarket-stake-math is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If polymarket-stake-math was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polymarket-stake-math before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks polymarket-stake-math-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.