polymarket-mcp-v2npm
polymarket-mcp-v2 is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10481) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 2.1.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in polymarket-mcp-v2 (npm)
What this malware does
polymarket-mcp-v2 is an information stealer and remote-access backdoor that runs automatically on npm install. It steals Solana keypairs, .env secrets and other credential files, and installs an attacker-controlled SSH key into ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, then opens port 22 for persistent access. Any host that installed it should be treated as compromised: check ~/.ssh/authorized_keys for an unrecognized key, check the firewall for a newly opened port 22, and rotate Solana keypairs, SSH keys and any secrets in reachable .env files.
The payload is a redeployment of the levex-refa/lint-builder toolkit documented in the February 2026 dev-protocol GitHub organization compromise, against new C2 infrastructure. A postinstall hook (node test.js) requires index.js and calls two functions with no installer action. from_str_2 collects host identifiers, appends the attacker key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, runs sudo chown -R <user>:<user> ~/.ssh, sudo ufw enable, sudo ufw allow 22/tcp, then recurses the filesystem for patterns fetched live from the C2 (/api/scan-patterns, /api/block-patterns) and uploads matches to /api/v1. from_str_1 does a narrower hardcoded search for id.json (Solana keypairs), config.toml and .env. The C2 (170.205.31.203:3001) served a Next.js panel titled "ENV Bot - HYPE"; a dev-mode error disclosed the operator path C:\1\anti-server\bot-wallet-management-v1\.
The package's postinstall hook loads index.js and executes routines that (1) recursively scan the install directory for id.json,.env, env, config.toml and Config.toml and POST their contents to http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/v1; (2) fetch an attacker-supplied SSH public key from http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/ssh-key, append it to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, chown the.ssh directory, then run sudo ufw enable and sudo ufw allow 22/tcp to expose port 22; and (3) fetch file-name patterns from the same host, enumerate the user's home directory (Unix) or all logical drives (Windows, via wmic logicaldisk get name with a PowerShell fallback), and batch-upload matching files to http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/v1 with username and platform metadata. Module names, endpoint URLs, and API paths are hidden behind \u00xx unicode escapes and reversed-string constructions to evade static review. The behavior combines install-time credential/file exfiltration with a persistent SSH remote-access backdoor.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-mcp-v2 (version 2.1.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-mcp-v2 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polymarket-mcp-v2 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If polymarket-mcp-v2 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polymarket-mcp-v2 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- skb1209 · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks polymarket-mcp-v2-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.