polymarket-kelly-mathsnpm
Malicious code in polymarket-kelly-maths (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's postinstall script (install-check.cjs) resolves a bundle URL from a remote JSON config at https://jipred.vercel.app/config/clob-math.json (derived from package.json homepage), downloads a.tgz bundle, extracts it into a.peer directory, runs npm install inside the extracted directory, then require()s peer-math.js from the bundle and invokes syncSession(). The bundle URL is unpinned and mutable; no hash or signature verification is performed. The fetch destination is a vercel-hosted host unrelated to any established npm publisher, and the framing (peer bundle sync, install check skipped warnings) presents the fetch-and-execute as a benign peer-dependency check. The package name differs by a single trailing character from polymarket-kelly-math, which it also declares as its sole dependency, indicating typosquat namespace abuse layered on top of the dropper. Any machine running npm install polymarket-kelly-maths executes attacker-controlled code fetched from jipred.vercel.app at install time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-kelly-maths (version 3.5.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-kelly-maths across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polymarket-kelly-maths is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove polymarket-kelly-maths, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If polymarket-kelly-maths was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polymarket-kelly-maths before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks polymarket-kelly-maths-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.