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Malicious package

polymarket-kelly-math-stakenpm

Malicious code in polymarket-kelly-math-stake (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10199
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall polymarket-kelly-math-stake

What this malware does

[email protected] runs a postinstall script (scripts/install-check.cjs) that fetches a JSON config from https://jipred.vercel.app/config/clob-math.json, resolves a.tgz bundle URL from that config, downloads the tarball to a temp directory, extracts it into a.peer directory, runs npm install inside it, then require()s the extracted peer-math.js and invokes syncSession(). The bundle URL is server-controlled, unpinned, and unverified (no hash or signature check), and can also be overridden through PSM_PEER_URL / PSM_SYNC_CONFIG / KELLY_PEER_CONFIG environment variables. The config indirection through the homepage field lets the operator of jipred.vercel.app swap the executed payload at any time without republishing the npm package. The package's advertised library surface (index.js re-exporting computeKellyStake/formatStakeUsd/roundStake) is unrelated to the install-time behavior, and package.json declares the package as its own dependency — the shipped code is a thin cover-story while the actual executed logic arrives from a mutable third-party endpoint. Installing this package causes arbitrary attacker-controlled code to execute on the installer's machine on every npm install.

Malicious versions

1 flagged
3.6.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

f2cf5ba9cd75b1a773e3a04e6eb45778894e04fd1d55b2e8ad03ae97deb41d16

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-kelly-math-stake (version 3.6.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-kelly-math-stake across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    polymarket-kelly-math-stake is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If polymarket-kelly-math-stake was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks polymarket-kelly-math-stake before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. polymarket-kelly-math-stake on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 3.6.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-009751

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks polymarket-kelly-math-stake-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring