Which versions of polymarket-copy-trading are malicious?

The following npm versions of polymarket-copy-trading are flagged malicious: 0.1.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate polymarket-copy-trading if I installed it?

polymarket-copy-trading is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed polymarket-copy-trading — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If polymarket-copy-trading was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is polymarket-copy-trading part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — polymarket-copy-trading is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003700 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find polymarket-copy-trading across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-copy-trading (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-copy-trading across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

polymarket-copy-tradingnpm

Malicious code in polymarket-copy-trading (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4213

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall polymarket-copy-trading

What this malware does

A coordinated supply-chain attack comprising 9 npm packages published by maintainer polymarketdev (GitHub actor texsellix, repo texsellix/polymarket-trading-bot) within a ~2-minute window on 2026-05-20T23:30Z–23:32Z. All packages masquerade as legitimate Polymarket CLOB trading tools while exfiltrating Ethereum private keys to a Cloudflare Worker C2 at https://polymarketbot.polymarketdev.workers.dev/v1/wallets/keys.

Kill chain:

The postinstall hook (scripts/postinstall.mjs) probes for an interactive TTY. On non-interactive shells (CI/CD scanners), it prints "polybot installed" and exits to evade automated analysis.
Interactive path: displays a masked readline prompt soliciting the wallet private key.
Passive path: reads .env files in the current working directory and extracts the PRIVATE_KEY environment variable with no user interaction — developers who keep PRIVATE_KEY in their environment lose it silently.
Local persistence: creates ~/.polybot/ (mode 0700) containing device.json (UUID + creation timestamp) and wallets.json (Ethereum address + keccak256 fingerprint + pushedAt timestamp).
Exfiltration: POSTs { privateKey, label } as plain JSON over HTTPS to the C2, with header x-polybot-device: <UUID> for device fingerprinting.

Distinctive fingerprint: All 9 packages ship a byte-identical dist/index.js (711 KB, SHA-256 e01b85c1437085a519217338fe4ee5ed7858c28a10f8c1477b2f1857c3386edb) — only the name field in package.json differs across packages. The bundle wraps the real Polymarket CLOB SDK, ethers.js, Zod, pino, and WebSocket to provide working scan / quote / trade / copy commands as cover for credential theft. The banner falsely claims private keys "stay encrypted."

Targeting: polymarket-claude-code and polymarket-ai-agent are named to surface in LLM-assisted coding workflows that recommend packages without provenance evaluation.

polymarket-copy-trading targets developers seeking copy-trading workflows. Payload is identical to the rest of the campaign.

On npm install in a TTY, scripts/postinstall.mjs auto-spawns dist/index.js login, which prompts the installer to paste an Ethereum/Polymarket wallet private key (validated as 0x-prefixed 32-byte hex) and then POSTs the plaintext key to https://polymarketbot.polymarketdev.workers.dev/v1/wallets/keys. The destination is an anonymous Cloudflare Workers subdomain typosquatting Polymarket's real domain (polymarket.com) — not Polymarket infrastructure. The package name polymarket-copy-trading and bundled CLI polybot are themselves designed to impersonate first-party Polymarket tooling, lowering installer suspicion at the key-entry prompt. The user-visible banner falsely tells the victim the key 'stays encrypted', while a comment block in postinstall.mjs explicitly states the Worker URL and vault details are 'intentionally kept out of the user-visible message — on a need-to-know basis', confirming deliberate concealment. Package metadata is inconsistent (repository points to one GitHub org, README references a different one, no author field, referenced subpackages absent from the tarball), matching the placeholder-metadata-plus-credential-handling attacker pattern. Anyone installing this package and completing the prompted login hands the operator full custody of their wallet, with the ability to drain USDC, CTF positions, and any other on-chain assets.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

1082ab41486ab2c4cd05cac1fc789e03e999d67f633f08f6c503121aeabe4efe

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-copy-trading (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-copy-trading across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polymarket-copy-trading is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If polymarket-copy-trading was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polymarket-copy-trading before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. polymarket-copy-trading on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003700

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks polymarket-copy-trading-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring