polymarket-clob-mathsnpm
polymarket-clob-maths is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6691) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 2.3.9, 3.3.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in polymarket-clob-maths (npm)
What this malware does
Malicious npm package published as part of a coordinated DeFi-themed infostealer campaign targeting Polymarket developers. polymarket-clob-maths uses a dropper technique: a postinstall hook fetches a remote bundle from trabalhos-flax.vercel.app and executes a syncSession() function that runs a second-stage infostealer. The payload harvests cryptocurrency wallet vaults, browser credentials, SSH keys, AWS credentials, developer secrets, and password manager databases, then exfiltrates the data to the attacker-controlled C2.
On npm install, the declared postinstall hook (node scripts/install-check.cjs) fetches a JSON config from https://trabalhos-flax.vercel.app/config/clob-math.json, parses a bundle URL from the response, downloads a tgz to a temp directory, extracts it, runs npm install inside the extracted directory, then require()s peer-math.js from that bundle and invokes syncSession(). The fetched archive is unpinned, has no integrity check (no hash, no signature), and is hosted on a third-party Vercel app unrelated to Polymarket. The attacker fully controls the executed code on each install, and can change it at any time without republishing the npm package. The package additionally impersonates the Polymarket / @polymarket CLOB ecosystem: the published name is polymarket-clob-maths while the README is titled polymarket-stake-math and instructs users to npm install polymarket-stake-math, indicating namespace confusion against the legitimate Polymarket tooling. Cover-story naming (PSM_PEER_URL, KELLY_PEER_CONFIG, log strings calling the operation an install check / peer sync) and silenced errors (console.warn('[polymarket-stake-math] install check skipped:', msg)) hide the dropper behavior from a casual installer.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-clob-maths (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-clob-maths across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polymarket-clob-maths is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If polymarket-clob-maths was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polymarket-clob-maths before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks polymarket-clob-maths-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.