polymarket-clob-clientnpm
Malicious code in polymarket-clob-client (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package is published as polymarket-clob-client, an unscoped lookalike of the legitimate @polymarket/clob-client maintained by Polymarket, but the shipped code is the third-party Hyperliquid SDK targeting a completely different exchange. package.json declares "description": "Hyperliquid API SDK for all major JS runtimes..." and the homepage points at github.com/nktkas/hyperliquid. The HTTP transport in script/transport/http/mod.js hardcodes https://api.hyperliquid.xyz as the default mainnet endpoint (exports.MAINNET_API_URL = "https://api.hyperliquid.xyz"). A developer who installs this package believing they are integrating with Polymarket's CLOB will instead be signing wallet messages and submitting trading orders to Hyperliquid. The structural signals — a clear name-squat of a well-known DeFi brand combined with code that silently routes wallet signatures and order intent to an unrelated venue — present concrete installer harm: misdirected funds and trading actions, regardless of whether the misnaming is intentional or negligent.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for polymarket-clob-client (version 2.1.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging polymarket-clob-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
polymarket-clob-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If polymarket-clob-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks polymarket-clob-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks polymarket-clob-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.