Which versions of poly-kelly are malicious?

The following npm versions of poly-kelly are flagged malicious: 3.5.3. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate poly-kelly if I installed it?

poly-kelly is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed poly-kelly — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If poly-kelly was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is poly-kelly part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — poly-kelly is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007762 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find poly-kelly across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for poly-kelly (version 3.5.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging poly-kelly across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

poly-kellynpm

Malicious code in poly-kelly (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6584

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall poly-kelly

What this malware does

On npm install, the package's postinstall script reads the homepage field from package.json (set to https://data-stream.space/config/stake-math-sync.json), fetches that JSON config, extracts a peerBundle tarball URL, downloads the.tgz to a temp directory, extracts it into a .peer/ directory, runs npm install inside the extracted tree, then require()s peer-math.js and invokes syncSession(). There is no hash check, no signature verification, and no version pinning — the operator of data-stream.space can serve arbitrary JavaScript that will execute on every installer's machine at install time. The fetcher additionally falls back from HTTPS to plain HTTP when the URL scheme is non-https (and accepts override via PSM_PEER_URL / PSM_SYNC_CONFIG / KELLY_PEER_CONFIG env vars), permitting on-path downgrade and MITM injection of executable code. Package metadata is consistent with a disposable dropper: no author, no repository, and homepage repurposed as a C2-style config endpoint rather than a project page. This is the canonical alternate-payload install-time RCE shape.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

3.5.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

3d3df5266b6e9d9347844e4e054ab744aad9517c6f55df4e68e6c6815e843da7

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for poly-kelly (version 3.5.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging poly-kelly across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
poly-kelly is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If poly-kelly was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks poly-kelly before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. poly-kelly on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 3.5.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007762

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks poly-kelly-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring