platform-temponpm
Malicious code in platform-tempo (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] declares a preinstall hook that runs poc.js on every npm install. The script collects host identity (os.hostname(), whoami /all / id, ipconfig / ip a), the parent project's package.json, git remotes, CI configuration files (.gitlab-ci.yml, .github/workflows/*, Jenkinsfile, azure-pipelines.yml), and a curated dump of environment variables matching TOKEN/AWS/AZURE/NPM/GITHUB/GITLAB/CI patterns. The collected data is HTTPS POSTed to a hardcoded interactsh OAST domain (d8a5d9pon5bugoc35cngp9hcregcqyezu.oast.me) with the package name as the path, plus a DNS beacon to the same host. The package name platform-tempo combined with version 99.0.1 is the canonical dependency-confusion shape — designed to be auto-resolved by an internal package resolver in preference to a private package of the same name. Self-described bug bounty framing in the package description does not change the install-time impact on any third party whose resolver picks up this public name: their CI tokens, cloud credentials, and source-tree metadata are shipped to the attacker-controlled OAST endpoint.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for platform-tempo (version 99.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging platform-tempo across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
platform-tempo is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If platform-tempo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks platform-tempo before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks platform-tempo-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.