pino-ulidnpm
Advisory published Updated
pino-ulid is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16154) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 2.12.2, 2.12.3, 3.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in pino-ulid (npm)
What this malware does
The npm package pino-ulid is named like a ULID generator, but it is a remote-access trojan. On install, its package.json postinstall script runs node dist/node/utils.js (after checking the dist files exist with existsSync). dist/node/utils.js writes a PID lock file, sets up persistence on Windows using schtasks and reg under the name pkg-agent, skips machines with fewer than 4 CPUs, and then starts dist/node/payload.js as a detached child process. dist/node/payload.js (about 456 KB, SHA-256 3a9089e9db3650dd6d1584fae709022002dc34854b961abfb014a90f0a7c6a50) is the agent. It connects to a hardcoded WebSocket command-and-control (C2) server. The C2 URL is hidden in dist/agent/config.js as a base64 string XORed with the 8-byte key [90,60,126,18,159,75,109,138], which decodes to ws://95.216.232.162:8010/ (HTTP form http://95.216.232.162:8010/, 15000 ms heartbeat). The agent sends a machine id and system info to the C2, reconnects if the link drops, and supports a deploy_binary command: the C2 sends base64 content that the agent writes to disk and runs, replacing itself and setting up persistence again. This gives the attacker remote code execution on the victim machine. The ULID name and description are just cover for the bundled agent that runs on install.
pino-ulid impersonates the popular pino and ulid packages (homepage points at github.com/ulid/javascript) and ships a genuine ULID code path as cover. The package.json postinstall hook runs node dist/node/utils.js, which spawns dist/node/payload.js detached with stdio ignored and unref'd, gated by a minimum CPU-count check (sandbox evasion) and a prior-install check against schtasks / HKCU Run / launchd / systemd / autostart. The bundled 466 KB dist/node/payload.js self-labels as Package-bin Agent - Bundled payload, includes the ws client, decodes a hardcoded configuration via Buffer.from(enc, 'base64'), derives a per-host id via getSystemMachineId/defaultAgentId, and opens a WebSocket control channel. Its ws.on('message',...) handler reaches execSync/spawnSync sinks and writes attacker-supplied task.contentBase64 bytes to disk via writeFile, providing remote shell execution and arbitrary file drop on the installer's host. The agent installs cross-platform boot persistence: a systemd user unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/pkg-agent.service and/or ~/.config/autostart/pkg-agent.desktop on Linux, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.launchkeeper.pkg-agent.plist on macOS, and a Task Scheduler entry plus HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value pkg-agent on Windows. Running npm install pino-ulid installs a persistent remotely-controlled agent unrelated to the advertised ULID functionality.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for pino-ulid (3 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
pino-ulid establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If pino-ulid was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks pino-ulid-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.