pino-ulidnpm
pino-ulid is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16154) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 2.12.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in pino-ulid (npm)
What this malware does
pino-ulid impersonates the popular pino and ulid packages (homepage points at github.com/ulid/javascript) and ships a genuine ULID code path as cover. The package.json postinstall hook runs node dist/node/utils.js, which spawns dist/node/payload.js detached with stdio ignored and unref'd, gated by a minimum CPU-count check (sandbox evasion) and a prior-install check against schtasks / HKCU Run / launchd / systemd / autostart. The bundled 466 KB dist/node/payload.js self-labels as Package-bin Agent - Bundled payload, includes the ws client, decodes a hardcoded configuration via Buffer.from(enc, 'base64'), derives a per-host id via getSystemMachineId/defaultAgentId, and opens a WebSocket control channel. Its ws.on('message',...) handler reaches execSync/spawnSync sinks and writes attacker-supplied task.contentBase64 bytes to disk via writeFile, providing remote shell execution and arbitrary file drop on the installer's host. The agent installs cross-platform boot persistence: a systemd user unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/pkg-agent.service and/or ~/.config/autostart/pkg-agent.desktop on Linux, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.launchkeeper.pkg-agent.plist on macOS, and a Task Scheduler entry plus HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value pkg-agent on Windows. Running npm install pino-ulid installs a persistent remotely-controlled agent unrelated to the advertised ULID functionality.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pino-ulid (version 2.12.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pino-ulid across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pino-ulid is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove pino-ulid, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If pino-ulid was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pino-ulid before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks pino-ulid-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.