pino-testkitnpm
pino-testkit is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16484) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 10.4.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in pino-testkit (npm)
What this malware does
[email protected] impersonates the widely-used pino logger: package.json declares the name pino-testkit with pino's description, lists Matteo Collina as author and the real pino maintainers as contributors, and the README is a mechanical copy of pino's README with pino rewritten to pino-testkit. The shipped source is largely a copy of pino with an extra file lib/contract.js wired in. pino.js exports chain, whose body calls contract(), so require('pino-testkit')(...) reaches the added file at load/call time. lib/contract.js uses a deterministic Fisher-Yates-style shuffle plus character substitution (\x25, \x23\x30, \x23\x31) to reconstruct the string Function and pluck Function off a captured global (ype[OUN]), then builds a new function from a second decoded body and immediately invokes it (cMp(7746)). Before doing so it hoists require and module onto global, so the dynamically constructed code can pull arbitrary further modules. Obfuscation of an executable payload combined with dynamic Function-constructor execution and require/module hoisting in a package that presents itself as pino is the canonical typosquat-dropper shape, giving the publisher arbitrary code execution on any consumer that requires or uses this package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pino-testkit (version 10.4.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pino-testkit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pino-testkit is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove pino-testkit, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If pino-testkit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pino-testkit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks pino-testkit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.