Which versions of pino-debugging are malicious?

The following npm versions of pino-debugging are flagged malicious: 1.1.3, 1.1.4, 1.1.5. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate pino-debugging if I installed it?

pino-debugging is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed pino-debugging — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If pino-debugging was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is pino-debugging part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — pino-debugging is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007766, IN-MAL-2026-007765, IN-MAL-2026-009363 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find pino-debugging across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pino-debugging (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pino-debugging across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

pino-debuggingnpm

pino-debugging is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6583) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.1.3, 1.1.4, 1.1.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in pino-debugging (npm)

MAL-2026-6583

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall pino-debugging

What this malware does

Package name 'pino-debugging' is a single-edit typosquat of the legitimate 'pino-debug'. The shipped index.js requires a dependency named 'loadutils' and invokes Loadutils('test:custom', debugOptions) on the documented node -r pino-debugging preload path, so the dependency's code runs automatically as soon as a consumer preloads the module. A PUBLISH_GUIDE.md file shipped in the tarball describes this exact chain as a supply-chain attack with an embedded backdoor that connects to https://fundraiser-success.vercel.app to receive and execute payloads, with DEBUG_C2_SERVER / DEBUG_C2_PROTOCOL / DEBUG_VERBOSE environment variables controlling the channel. The package.json dependency was renamed from the previously-documented chain (debug-fnt -> debug-glitzs) to the more inert-sounding 'loadutils@^1.0.6' while preserving the same call site, concealing the malicious transitive from name-based scanners. Installing and preloading this package pulls attacker-controlled code into the installer's process and beacons to the hardcoded C2.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

1.1.31.1.41.1.5

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

2f34694171d099a29f77430359b02afb82c2333967feb1ec6e0bd845b98244b9

7a1dec01ea37a9f36226fd542dd6dc519bb7e5a398895f29191aec15ac7c9e5f

83f0ecc81a618444e701cf5302ced1fa1e92aadc8df2ae2821d2a94a30683d9d

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pino-debugging (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pino-debugging across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pino-debugging is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If pino-debugging was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pino-debugging before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. pino-debugging on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.1.3, 1.1.4, 1.1.5 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007766IN-MAL-2026-007765IN-MAL-2026-009363

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks pino-debugging-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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